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Gender Differences and Dynamics in Competition: 
The Role of Luck
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We present experimental evidence which sheds new light on why women may be less 
competitive than men. Specifically, we observe striking differences in how men and women 
respond to good and bad luck in a competitive environment. Following a loss, women tend to 
reduce effort, and the effect is independent of the monetary value of the prize that the women 
failed to win. Men, on the other hand, reduce effort only after failing to win large prizes. 
Responses to previous competitive outcomes explain about 11% of the variation that we 
observe in women’s efforts, but only about 4% of the variation in the effort of men, and 
differential responses to luck account for about half of the gender performance gap in our 
experiment. These findings help to explain both female underperformance in environments 
with repeated competition and the tendency for women to select into tournaments at a lower 
rate than men. 
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Are women less competitive than men, and if so why? In this paper we address these questions in
a novel light by providing experimental evidence of di®erences in how men and women respond
to experiencing good or bad luck in a competitive work environment. In particular, we ¯nd
gender di®erences in how work e®ort responds to wins and losses in previous rounds of a real
e®ort competition. In each of 10 rounds subjects are paired and informed of the value of the
monetary prize that they are competing for, which varies randomly across pairings and over
rounds. The prize is awarded to one of the pair members depending on the relative work e®orts
of the pair members in the \slider task", which involves positioning a number of sliders on a
screen, and some element of chance which we control.
Our results show that following a loss, women tend to reduce e®ort, and the e®ect is inde-
pendent of the monetary value of the prize that the women failed to win. Men, on the other
hand, reduce e®ort only after failing to win large prizes. We also ¯nd that women lower e®ort
after winning a large prize compared to e®ort after winning a small prize, but we ¯nd no such
e®ect for men. Overall, responses to previous competitive outcomes explain about 11% of the
observed variation in the work e®ort of women but only about 4% of the variation in the work
e®ort of men, and the impact of wins and losses on later work e®ort is also more persistent over
time for women.
Decomposition analysis shows that these di®erential responses to luck account for about
half of the gender performance gap that we observe in our experiment. Furthermore, our results
suggest a new mechanism which may contribute to a greater distaste for competition on the part
of women: if the negative response to losing at all prizes and winning at high prizes is mediated
by psychological pain or discomfort which is anticipated, women should indeed choose to enter
tournaments less frequently than men. The behavioral responses to luck may be mediated by,
or correlated with, mood, con¯dence, stress and blood pressure, and we link our ¯ndings to the
literature which looks at di®erences across gender in psycho-physiological responses to winning
and losing in competitive environments. Women's negative response to winning large prizes may
also be linked to a higher degree of inequity aversion, which could induce feelings of guilt after
winning a large prize or cause women to reduce e®ort in the following period to reduce their
probability of winning and so redistribute wealth in expectation to the other members of the
subject pool.
Our ¯ndings relate to a growing body of evidence which shows gender di®erences in com-
petitive environments. In a one-shot competition, Gneezy et al. (2003) show that men perform
signi¯cantly better at solving mazes, even though there is no signi¯cant gender performance gap
1when the subjects are paid piece-rate. Similarly, Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) ¯nd that boys
run faster than girls when competing head-to-head, but not when performing individually, and
Ors et al. (2008) ¯nd that men perform better in a competitive HEC Paris entrance examination,
even though women perform better in high school and in the ¯rst year of the course when success
is measured against an absolute standard. Using a simple math task, Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007) ¯nd no gender di®erence in performance, but do ¯nd that women are less likely than
men to choose to enter a tournament, even after allowing for di®erential levels of con¯dence,
risk aversion and aversion to feedback about relative performance. In various settings, Gupta
et al. (2005), Garratt et al. (2009), Cason et al. (2010) and Fletschner et al. (2010) also ¯nd that
women are less likely to choose to compete, while in a repeated environment with a forecasting
task Vandegrift and Yavas (2009) ¯nd that the selection e®ect is persistent over time.1
Understanding the source of these gender di®erences in competitive environments is of prime
importance for making sense of the gender gap in labor markets and formulating appropriate
policy responses. Competition for promotions and bonuses plays an important role in many
¯rms (for evidence from the U.S., Japan and Denmark see Vandegrift and Yavas, 2009, and
the references therein). Altonji and Blank (1999) survey the large literature on the impact of
gender on labor market outcomes and conclude that \a large share of gender di®erentials remain
\unexplained" even after controlling for detailed measures of individual and job characteristics"
(p. 3249). The gender gap is particularly stark at the top of the corporate hierarchy: Bertrand
and Hallock (2001) ¯nd that only 2.5% of top U.S. executives are female, and that these female
executives earn 45% less than their male counterparts. Arguably, competition for these top jobs
is more intense than for lower or middle-ranking positions which pay less and are in greater
supply.
Standard explanations for the gender gap in labor markets include discrimination, ability
di®erences and a stronger preference for investing in child-rearing. The evidence from Niederle
and Vesterlund (2007) and Gneezy et al. (2003) suggests a further explanation: females are more
averse to competition and perform worse once forced to compete. Indeed, using Danish survey
data, Kleinjans (2009) ¯nds a link between a dislike for competition and occupational choice:
women's stronger distaste for competition appears to decrease expected educational achievement
and increase occupational segregation. The contribution of this paper is to suggest a new
mechanism which may account for this established greater distaste for competition on the part
1The e®ect is not universal: for instance Gneezy et al. (2009) ¯nd the same e®ect in a traditional patriarchal
society, but not in a matrilineal one; Booth and Nolen (2009) ¯nd strong evidence of the e®ect for girls who attend
co-educational schools, but only weak evidence for girls who attend single-sex schools; Dargnies (2009) ¯nds that
the gender di®erence in entry rates into a tournament disappears when subjects compete in teams; while Wozniak
et al. (2010) ¯nd that, controlling for con¯dence and risk aversion, feedback about relative performance in an
earlier task paid piece-rate eliminates the gender di®erence in their sample.
2of females. As described above, we ¯nd di®erential responses by gender to winning and losing in
competitive environments which can explain, at least in part, both female underperformance in
environments with repeated competition and the tendency for women to select into tournaments
at a lower rate than men. To the extent that women ¯nd the experience of losing more painful
on average than men do, they may be less inclined to pursue career opportunities which involve
multiple rounds of competition for new positions, promotions and pay rises.
If psycho-physiological responses to winning and losing mean that women ¯nd competition
inherently more unpleasant than men do, an appropriate response by ¯rms may be to reduce
the degree of competition built into their pay and promotion structures. Why then do ¯rms
not implement such policies? Two explanations suggest themselves. First, men may fail to
understand the extent to which women ¯nd competition unpleasant and attribute too much of
the di®erence in behavior across gender to ability di®erences and a lower preference for work
relative to alternatives such as child-rearing. As men dominate top-ranking positions, they
tend to shape pay and promotion structures, so the gender gap may become self-perpetuating.
Second, it may be unpro¯table to change the remuneration structure: ¯rms may ¯nd it more
e±cient to operate highly competitive structures in order to induce high e®ort while accepting
that a lower female representation will result, especially at high rank and remuneration. The
¯rst explanation entails a role for government intervention on e±ciency grounds and the second
on grounds of equity.
A±rmative action programs to increase female representation can play a role under either
scenario. In the ¯rst case, once female representation in higher-ranking positions improves,
greater weight will be placed on the female distaste for competition when deciding pay and
promotion policy. In the second case, the a±rmative action may reduce e±ciency but will
improve equity across gender in society. Niederle et al. (2010) show that instituting a quota
system, whereby at least one of two winners must be female, increases the rate of female entry
into a tournament by more than the resulting increase in the probability of winning would
predict. Many more high ability women choose to enter so the average quality of the pool of
entrants is hardly a®ected by the quota, suggesting that a±rmative action programs may not
be very costly. According to the authors, part of the explanation is that the a±rmative action
reduces the female distaste for competition by making the competition more gender-speci¯c.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental design;
Section 3 provides an overview of the data; Section 4 presents the econometric model and results;
Section 5 interprets the results and discusses them in the context of the existing literature;
Section 6 concludes; ¯nally, Appendix A o®ers further robustness analysis while Appendix B
lays out the experimental instructions.
32 Experimental design
We ran 6 experimental sessions at the Nu±eld Centre for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS)
in Oxford, all conducted on weekdays at the same time of day in late February and early
March 2009 and lasting approximately 90 minutes. 20 student subjects (who did not report
Psychology or Economics as their main subject of study) participated in each session, with 120
participants in total. The subjects were drawn from the CESS subject pool which is managed
using the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE). The experimental
instructions (Appendix B) were provided to each subject in written form and were read aloud to
the subjects. Each subject was paid a show-up fee of $4 and earned an average of a further $10
during the experiment (all payments were in Pounds sterling). Subjects were paid privately in
cash by the laboratory administrator. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007).
At the start of each session 10 subjects were selected at random and were told that they
would be a \First Mover" for the duration of the session. The remaining 10 subjects were told
that they would be a \Second Mover" for the entirety of the session. Each session consisted of
2 practice rounds followed by 10 paying rounds. In every paying round, each First Mover was
paired anonymously with a Second Mover. The subjects were re-paired after every round using
Cooper et al. (1996)'s rotation-based \no contagion" matching algorithm. Each pair's prize was
chosen randomly from f$0:10;$0:20;:::;$3:90g and revealed to the pair members. The First
and Second Movers then completed our novel real e®ort \slider task" sequentially.2
The slider task consists of a screen with 48 sliders. Each slider is initially positioned at 0
and can be moved using the mouse to any integer location between 0 and 100. Each slider has
a number to its right showing its current position. A subject's \points score" in the task is the
number of sliders positioned at exactly 50 at the end of 120 seconds. Figure 1 shows a screen
of sliders as shown to the subjects in the laboratory. The slider task gives a ¯nely gradated
measure of performance and involves little randomness; thus we interpret a subject's point score
as e®ort exerted in the task.
After the Second Movers completed the task, each pair's prize for the round was awarded
to one of the pair members based on the points scores of the pair members and some element
of chance. The probability of winning the prize for each pair member was 50 plus his or her
own points score minus the other pair member's points score, all divided by 100 (so winning
probabilities were linear in the di®erence of the points scores). The winner of the prize for each
pair in every round was determined by a random draw uniform on [0;1]: the First Mover won
2In Gill and Prowse (2010), we used the same data set as here to test for disappointment aversion by looking
at within-round responses to a rival's choice of e®ort.
4Notes: The sliders were displayed on 22 inch widescreen monitors with a 1680 by 1050 pixel resolution. To move
the sliders, the subjects used 800 dpi USB mice with the scroll wheel disabled. To ensure that all the sliders are
equally di±cult to position correctly, the 48 sliders are arranged on the screen such that no two sliders are aligned
exactly one under the other.
Figure 1: Screen showing 48 sliders.
the prize if and only if the draw was lower than his or her probability of winning, and otherwise
the prize was awarded to the Second Mover.
The Second Mover discovered the points score of the First Mover he or she was paired with
before starting the task. During the task, a number of further pieces of information appeared at
the top of the subject's screen: the round number; the time remaining; whether the subject was
a First or Second Mover; the prize for the round; and the subject's points score in the task so
far. At the end of the round, the subjects saw a summary screen showing their own points score,
the other pair member's points score, their probability of winning the prize given the respective
points scores, the prize for the round and whether they were the winner or loser of the prize in
that round.3 At the end of the session, the ¯nal screen asked the subjects to report their gender.
There was no mention of gender prior to this ¯nal stage, and the experimental instructions
distributed at the start of the experiment did not indicate that information on gender would be
collected.
3In the practice rounds, the subjects were not told whether they had won or lost.
53 Overview of the data
We start by providing an overview of the data. Throughout we analyze only Second Movers:4
our sample consists of 30 male Second Movers and 28 female Second Movers observed completing
the slider task in each of the 10 paying rounds (two Second Movers did not report their gender).
The analysis focuses on behavior in rounds 3 onwards to allow for the e®ect on behavior of
winning or losing in the two preceding rounds.5
Figure 2 presents an initial summary of the raw data, split by gender. E®ort choices range
from 0 to 41. Figure 2(a) shows that the distribution of e®ort choices for men has a bigger
right-hand tail than that for women, while Figure 2(b) shows that the e®ect persists during the
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(b) Distributions of e®orts for rounds 6-10.
Figure 2: Distributions of e®ort choices.
The left-hand panel of Table 1 validates these observations: the proportion of women in the
right-hand tail of the overall distribution of e®ort choices is signi¯cantly smaller than for men.
For example, 75% of women's e®orts lie at or below the 60th percentile of the e®ort distribution
(the proportion is signi¯cantly greater than for men at the 5% level) and 92% lie at or below
the 80th (signi¯cantly greater than for men at the 1% level). The right-hand panel of Table 1
shows that these distributional di®erences are persistent, as suggested by Figure 2(b).
4We do not analyze data from the First Movers, who face a di®erent situation to that of the Second Movers
on a number of dimensions: (i) First Movers face a complicated strategic problem as they can in°uence Second
Mover e®ort through their own choice, while Second Movers face a pure optimization problem (Gill and Prowse,
2010, show that the Second Movers do indeed respond to First Mover e®ort choices); (ii) First Movers start the
task immediately after ¯nding out whether they won or lost in the previous round, while Second Movers have
time to internalize any psychological e®ects from winning or losing (while they wait for the new First Mover they
have been paired with to complete the task); and (iii) First Movers ¯nd out what their probability of winning
was at the same time as they discover whether they won or lost the round, while Second Movers choose their
probability of winning during the task (as they know the e®ort of the First Mover they have been paired with).
5Appendix A shows that there is no e®ect on behavior in a given round of winning or losing three rounds
previously.
6Rounds 3-10 Rounds 6-10
Men Women Di®erence SE Men Women Di®erence SE
Mean e®ort 26.383 24.580 1.803 1.192 26.747 24.879 1.868 1.345
P(E®ort · Q20) 0.217 0.243 -0.026 0.084 0.221 0.243 -0.023 0.083
P(E®ort · Q40) 0.375 0.509 -0.134 0.104 0.369 0.509 -0.141 0.116
P(E®ort · Q45) 0.411 0.583 -0.172 0.107 0.401 0.584 -0.183¤ 0.110
P(E®ort · Q50) 0.451 0.656 -0.205¤¤ 0.100 0.435 0.644 -0.209¤¤ 0.104
P(E®ort · Q55) 0.486 0.706 -0.220¤¤ 0.094 0.474 0.702 -0.227¤¤ 0.103
P(E®ort · Q60) 0.525 0.750 -0.225¤¤ 0.091 0.521 0.758 -0.237¤¤ 0.097
P(E®ort · Q80) 0.742 0.919 -0.178¤¤¤ 0.057 0.748 0.914 -0.166¤¤ 0.066




¤¤¤ denote, respectively, signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors are
bootstrapped allowing clustering at the subject level.
Note 2: P(E®ort· Qj) denotes the proportion of observations at or below the j
th percentile of the distribution
of e®ort choices, pooled over men and women. The j
th percentile is de¯ned as the smallest e®ort level such
that j% or more of observations lie at or below this level: because e®ort is discrete, we can therefore have
P(E®ort · Qj) > j%.
Table 1: Descriptive analysis of e®ort choices of men and women.
The tendency for women not to exert high levels of e®ort is so strong that 66% of women's
e®orts lie at or below the median, and men complete 1.8 sliders more than women on average
(see the left-hand panel of Table 1). Figure 3 shows round by round mean e®orts by gender:
men complete more sliders on average in every round.6 Signi¯cance tests provide support for
this gender performance gap: Table 1 reports that the proportion of women's e®orts at or below
the median is signi¯cantly greater than for men at the 5% level (for rounds 3 onwards and for
rounds 6 onwards); and a likelihood-ratio test shows that, jointly, the means and variances of
the distributions of e®ort split by gender are signi¯cantly di®erent from each other (rounds 3
onwards: p = 0:007; rounds 6 onwards: p = 0:027).7 However, the mean performance di®erence
of 1.8 sliders alone is not quite signi¯cant at conventional levels (as outliers cause the variance
to be high).
6The increase in mean e®ort from round 1 to round 3 is signi¯cantly bigger for women (t test; p < 0:05), which
suggests that learning is stronger for women in the ¯rst few rounds.
7This likelihood ratio test assumes that e®ort is the sum of a deterministic component and normally distributed
transient and permanent unobserved heterogeneity. The unrestricted likelihood allows the mean of e®ort, and
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Figure 3: Round by round mean e®ort choices.
4 Empirical analysis
What factors might help to explain the di®erences in e®ort by gender outlined in Section 3?
Clearly, men and women may di®er in average ability. In this paper, we focus on a further
explanation: men and women may respond di®erently to good and bad luck. In particular,
we look for gender di®erences in how Second Movers respond to whether they won or lost the
previous two rounds of competition.8 We ¯rst outline our model of behavior and discuss the
estimation strategy, and then report the results of the analysis.
4.1 Model and estimation strategy
We model behavior for rounds 3 onwards to allow for the e®ect on behavior of winning or losing
in the two preceding rounds. Speci¯cally, for males, e®ort in the rth round for the nth Second
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and for female Second Movers en;r is given by the same expression replacing each M (for male)
with F (for female).
In (1) Ln;r¡1 is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the nth Second Mover lost in
the previous round and zero otherwise. Wn;r¡1 is the equivalent dummy variable in the case
of a win. Ln;r¡2 and Wn;r¡2 are dummy variables for losing and winning two rounds previous
to round r. Given the method of determining the allocation of each pair's prize in each round
described above in Section 2, the values of these dummy variables depend partly on the relative
8As we will see in Table 2, measuring luck in terms of monetary winnings relative to what was expected does
not materially a®ect our results. Footnote 4 explains why we focus on Second Movers. As outlined in Appendix A,
we found no evidence that behavior in a given round was a®ected by winning or losing three rounds previously.
8work e®ort of the pair members, and partly on luck, in the form of the random draw.
vn;r represents the prize that the nth Second Mover was competing for in the rth round. We
interact the dummy variables for winning and losing with the relevant prizes to allow for the
fact that the impact of winning or losing might depend on how much was won or on how much
could have been won. We also include dummy variables for losing without a prize interaction to
determine the impact of losing rather than winning independent of the prize.9
The inclusion of the ·M and ·F terms controls for any e®ect of the current prize on behavior.
±M
r and ±F
r are round speci¯c intercepts, which control for di®erential learning and average
ability by gender. ¹n is a round invariant subject-speci¯c ¯xed e®ect, which allows for residual
heterogeneity in ability across subjects that is not picked up by the gender and round speci¯c
intercepts. Lastly, un;r is an unobservable that varies over rounds and over Second Movers and
captures di®erences between rounds in a Second Mover's e®ort choice that cannot be attributed
to the other terms in the model. un;r is assumed to have mean zero and to be uncorrelated
over individuals. Further, all persistence in unobservables is assumed to be captured by the
subject-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects, and therefore un;r is taken to be serially uncorrelated.10
The above constitutes a dynamic linear panel data model. By construction, the ¯xed e®ect
¹n impacts on previous e®orts, and therefore on previous winning and losing (as individuals
with high e®ort in an earlier round are more likely to have won the prize in that round), and
also a®ects current e®ort. Hence, the error term (¹n +un;r) is correlated with previous winning
and losing, and it follows that the OLS estimates of the parameters in (1) will be inconsistent.
We obtain consistent parameter estimates by using panel data Generalized Method of Moments
techniques (see Arellano and Bond, 1991; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988). Speci¯cally, taking ¯rst
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r + ¢un;r; for r = 4;:::;10; (2)
and an analogous equation can be written for females. First di®erencing therefore eliminates
the subject-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects. However, a further endogeneity problem arises in the ¯rst
di®erenced equations because the transformed error term ¢un;r is correlated with the dummy
variables for winning or losing in round r ¡ 1 (due to the correlation between un;r¡1 and en;r¡1
and therefore between un;r¡1 and winning and losing in the previous round).
The design of the experiment provides a number of valid instruments for the variables measur-
9 We do not include dummy variables for winning without a prize interaction as the dummy variables for
winning and losing are co-linear.
10The estimation results support the assumption that un;r is serially uncorrelated.
9ing the previous competitive outcomes in the ¯rst di®erenced equations: ¯rst, we use the random
draws which determine whether the nth Second Mover won the prize in the three rounds prior
to round r; second, we use the random prizes in these earlier rounds; third we use the random
draw interacted with the random prize for each of these earlier rounds; and fourth, we use the
e®ort choice of the nth Second Mover's rival in these earlier rounds. Furthermore, we use the
nth Second Mover's own e®ort two and three rounds prior to round r. All these instruments are
also interacted with a dummy variable for the subject being male.11 Appendix A shows that
our results are robust to dropping various subsets of these instruments, and also illustrates that
there is a correlation between previous random draws and current e®ort choices, which provides
more direct reduced form evidence that individuals respond to previous competitive outcomes.12
4.2 Description of results
We start by reporting our parameter estimates. We then translate the estimated parameters
into behavioral e®ects. Finally, we consider whether our results can explain part of the gender
di®erence in e®orts described in Section 3.
4.2.1 Parameter Estimates
Table 2 presents the estimated parameters for our preferred speci¯cation (that is the model
outlined in Section 4.1). We ¯nd some striking gender di®erences in the parameter estimates.
The large negative coe±cient on ¯F
1 , which is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at the 5% level,
indicates a strong negative impact on e®ort for women of having lost in the previous round
independent of the prize. However, we ¯nd no such e®ect for men. Furthermore, the negative
coe±cient on °F
1 , again signi¯cant at the 5% level, indicates that when women won a large prize
in the previous round they reduce e®ort compared to when they won a small prize. Again, we
¯nd no such e®ect for men. Instead, men work less hard after having lost when the prize was
large compared to having lost when the prize was small (negative coe±cient on µM
1 , signi¯cant
at the 5% level, with no corresponding e®ect for women). Figure 4 and Table 3, discussed in
Section 4.2.2 below, present these results in terms of behavioral impacts.
11To limit instrument proliferation, we collapse the instrument set by applying each instrument to all available
rounds jointly. Although competitive outcomes dated r¡2 are not endogenous with respect to the ¯rst di®erence
of the transitory errors, we instrument for these variables in the same way as for competitive outcomes dated
r ¡ 1 in order to maintain consistency. Our results are robust to this method of identifying the coe±cients on
competitive outcomes dated r ¡ 2. We identify the gender-speci¯c current prize e®ects and the round-by-round
changes in the gender-speci¯c intercepts using standard orthogonality conditions based on the ¯rst di®erenced
errors and the current prize and round dummies, and interactions of these variables with gender. Finally, we form
two moment conditions based on the level equations for men and women, and these moments allow us to identify
the level of the gender-speci¯c intercepts.
12As noted in footnote 2, in Gill and Prowse (2010) we analyzed within-round responses to a rival's choice of
e®ort. Although we found no signi¯cant gender di®erences, we have nonetheless checked that our results here are
robust to including First Mover e®ort and First Mover e®ort interacted with the prize as explanatory variables.
10Table 2 also provides some evidence of the persistence of these e®ects for women. The impact
of losing independent of the prize dampens e®ort two rounds later (negative coe±cient on ¯F
2 ,
although the e®ect is only signi¯cant at the 10% level). The negative impact of winning a large
prize compared to winning a small prize also persists for two rounds (negative coe±cient on
°F
2 , signi¯cant at the 5% level). The magnitude of these e®ects on e®ort two rounds later are
somewhat smaller than for the same e®ects on e®ort in the next round. We ¯nd no evidence of
persistence for men; as outlined in Appendix A, nor do we ¯nd evidence that winning or losing
has any impact on behavior three rounds later, either for men or for women. Our subjects thus
seem to bracket the rounds of the competition fairly narrowly in the sense that they respond
temporarily to the outcome of just one or two previous rounds (see Read et al., 1999, for evidence
of narrow bracketing more generally).
The partial R2 shows that about 6% of the variation across subjects and rounds observed in
the data can be attributed to the winning and losing terms in our model (bootstrapped standard
errors show that the partial R2 is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at the 1% level). For women,
the partial R2 suggests that about 11% of the variation can be attributed to the luck terms
(signi¯cant at the 5% level), while for men about 4% of the variation can be attributed to the
response to luck (signi¯cant at the 10% level). The Hansen test does not reject the validity of
our overidentifying restrictions; therefore we do not reject our additional moments.13
In the preferred speci¯cation, we use winning and losing as our measure of luck. Arguably, a
winner is luckier the more she wins relative to what she expected to win in the round, which in
turn depends both on the prize and her probability of winning (from the experimental design,
this probability depends linearly on the di®erence between the winner's e®ort choice and that of
her rival). Similarly a loser is more unlucky the more she expected to win. The second column
of Table 2 shows that introducing this more nuanced view of luck does not materially a®ect our
results.14 The reason is that there is little variation in winning probabilities across winners or
across losers, because winning probabilities are mostly condensed in the range [40%;60%]. For
winners, 79.2% of observations lie in this range across all 10 rounds, while 80.8% do for losers.
13An Arellano-Bond test for the null hypothesis of zero second order autocorrelation in the ¯rst di®erenced
transitory errors has p values of 0.202 for the preferred speci¯cation and 0.143 for the speci¯cation checking the
robustness to our measure of luck. Thus we do not reject our assumption that un;r is intertemporally uncorrelated.
14The main di®erence is that in this alternative speci¯cation the evidence for the persistence of the e®ects for
women is weaker.
11Preferred Robustness to
Speci¯cation Measure of Luck
Estimate SE Estimate SE
¯M
1 (Lost round r ¡ 1; Men) -0.093 0.836 -0.424 0.809
¯M
2 (Lost round r ¡ 2; Men) -3.093 2.213 -2.922 2.262
¯F
1 (Lost round r ¡ 1; Women) -3.499¤¤ 1.611 -3.169¤¤ 1.613
¯F
2 (Lost round r ¡ 2; Women) -2.271¤ 1.340 -2.121 1.367
°M
1 (Won round r ¡ 1 £ Prize in round r ¡ 1; Men) -0.201 0.273 -0.333 0.529
°M
2 (Won round r ¡ 2 £ Prize in round r ¡ 2; Men) -0.773 0.733 -1.584 1.456
°F
1 (Won round r ¡ 1 £ Prize in round r ¡ 1; Women) -1.299¤¤ 0.570 -2.259¤¤ 1.132
°F
2 (Won round r ¡ 2 £ Prize in round r ¡ 2; Women) -1.057¤¤ 0.491 -1.854¤ 0.999
µM
1 (Lost round r ¡ 1 £ Prize in round r ¡ 1; Men) -0.847¤¤ 0.431 -1.254¤¤ 0.549
µM
2 (Lost round r ¡ 2 £ Prize in round r ¡ 2; Men) 0.071 0.417 -0.025 0.731
µF
1 (Lost round r ¡ 1 £ Prize in round r ¡ 1; Women) 0.168 0.257 0.294 0.501
µF
2 (Lost round r ¡ 2 £ Prize in round r ¡ 2; Women) 0.125 0.502 0.292 0.988
±M
10 (Intercept in round 10; Men) 30.248¤¤¤ 2.110 30.139¤¤¤ 1.880
±F
10 (Intercept in round 10; Women) 30.370¤¤¤ 1.945 29.811¤¤¤ 1.993
R2 0.739 0.738
R2 (Men only) 0.772 0.773
R2 (Women only) 0.654 0.652
Partial R2 (due to winning and losing e®ects) 0.061 0.057
Partial R2 (due to winning and losing e®ects; Men only) 0.041 0.036
Partial R2 (due to winning and losing e®ects; Women only) 0.105 0.103





¤¤¤ denote, respectively, signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity and allow clustering at the subject level.
Note 2: The coe±cients on the contemporaneous prize e®ects (·
M and ·





r ) for rounds 3 to 9 are not reported in the table. The prize e®ects do not di®er signi¯cantly by gender.
Note 3: Letting Pn;r¡j represent, in proportionate terms, the n
th Second Mover's probability of winning the
prize in round r ¡ j, the robustness to the measure of luck replaces °
M
j Wn;r¡j £ vn;r¡j with °
M
j Wn;r¡j £
vn;r¡j £ (1 ¡ Pn;r¡j) and µ
M
j Ln;r¡j £ vn;r¡j with µ
M
j Ln;r¡j £ vn;r¡j £ Pn;r¡j for males, and similarly for
females. Luck is then measured in terms of monetary winnings relative to expectations. Because, on average,
Pn;r¡j = 0:5 the coe±cients in this alternative speci¯cation tend to be higher.
Table 2: Estimated parameters.
124.2.2 Behavioral e®ects
Figure 4 shows how the estimated parameters of the preferred speci¯cation from Table 2 translate
into behavioral e®ects. E®ort following a win is signi¯cantly downward sloping in the prize for
women (at the 5% level), and not signi¯cantly sloped for men (see the coe±cients on °F
1 and
°M
1 in Table 2). For women, e®ort following a win at the highest prize of $3.90 is about 4.9
sliders lower than following a win at the lowest prize of $0.10. The reverse holds true for e®ort
following a loss, which is signi¯cantly downward sloping in the prize for men (at the 5% level),
but not signi¯cantly sloped for women (see the coe±cients on µM
1 and µF
1 ). For men, e®ort
following a loss at the highest prize of $3.90 is about 3.2 sliders lower than following a loss at
the lowest prize of $0.10. These e®ects are sizeable in the context of a mean level of e®ort of




































£0.10 £1.00 £2.00 £3.00 £3.90
Prize in previous round
Men after winning Women after winning
Men after losing Women after losing
Notes: The e®ects are presented for the average male and the average female in round 10, ignoring the contem-








2 = 0 for males, and similarly for females). Alternative assumptions would shift the lines for men up or down
relative to those for women.
Figure 4: Graphical description of impact of winning or losing in previous round.
Table 3 shows, by gender, how winning a given prize impacts on e®ort relative to losing at
the same prize. At low prizes women work signi¯cantly less hard following a loss, while there
is no signi¯cant e®ect for men: after losing at the lowest prize of $0.10, women reduce e®ort
by about 3.4 sliders compared to having won such a prize; after losing at a prize of $1, women
reduce e®ort by about 2 sliders (both e®ects are signi¯cant at the 5% level). Men, on the other
hand, work signi¯cantly less hard after losing at larger prizes: after losing at a prize of $2, men
reduce e®ort by about 1.4 sliders compared to having won such a prize; after losing at a prize
13of $3 men reduce e®ort by about 2 sliders; after losing at the highest prize of $3.90 men reduce
e®ort by about 2.6 sliders (the ¯rst e®ect is signi¯cant at the 1% level, the other two at the 5%
level). There is no similar e®ect for women: indeed, we ¯nd that women actually work harder
after losing at a large prize than after winning the same prize, though the e®ect is not signi¯cant
except at the highest prize of $3.90, and then only marginally so (p = 0:093). The magnitude
of these e®ects ranges from about 5% to about 13% of average e®ort in rounds 3 to 10.
Table 3 also calculates whether these behavioral di®erences by gender are statistically signif-
icant. From the third column we see that, at high prizes, the di®erence in response by gender to
winning relative to losing is strongly signi¯cant (at a prize of $3, p = 0:013; at a prize of $3.90,
p = 0:007). At the lowest prize of $0.10, the di®erence is marginally signi¯cant (p = 0:067).
Winning relative to losing in Men Women Di®erence
previous round at di®erent prizes E®ect SE E®ect SE E®ect SE
$0.10 0.158 0.799 3.352¤¤ 1.548 3.195¤ 1.742
$1.00 0.739 0.529 2.032¤¤ 1.007 1.293 1.138
$2.00 1.385¤¤¤ 0.534 0.565 0.612 -0.820 0.812
$3.00 2.031¤¤ 0.846 -0.902 0.823 -2.933¤¤ 1.180




¤¤¤ denote, respectively, signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity and allow clustering at the subject level.
Note 2: The impact on e®ort of winning relative to losing at a particular prize is calculated as the di®erence
between e®ort following a win at that prize and e®ort following a loss at that prize, as predicted by the
estimated parameters of the preferred speci¯cation from Table 2.
Table 3: Behavioral impact on e®orts from the estimated parameters.
Finally, we calculate how much losing at the highest prize reduces e®ort in the next round
relative to winning the lowest prize. Women reduce e®ort by about 2.714 sliders (SE=1.306)
after losing at a prize of $3.90 compared to winning a prize of $0.10, and the e®ect is signi¯cant
at the 5% level. For men, the reduction is slightly bigger at 3.376 sliders (SE=1.418), and is
also signi¯cant at the 5% level.
In summary, we ¯nd that women tend to reduce e®ort following a loss compared to e®ort
after winning a small prize, and the e®ect is independent of the monetary value of the prize that
the women failed to win. Men, on the other hand, reduce e®ort only after failing to win large
prizes. We also ¯nd that women lower e®ort after winning a large prize compared to winning a
small prize, but we ¯nd no such e®ect for men.
144.2.3 Luck and gender di®erences in e®orts
Section 3 described how the whole distribution of e®orts are di®erent by gender, with men
exhibiting a higher average level of e®ort. On average, men completed about 1.8 sliders more
than women, and a signi¯cantly greater proportion of women's e®orts lie below the sample
median. We now use a decomposition analysis to determine the extent to which the di®erential
responses to winning and losing can account for this performance gap between men and women.
The decomposition analysis sets the coe±cients on the winning and losing terms to zero,
while continuing to use the other parameter estimates. To undertake this exercise, we also make
the normalizing assumption that winning the smallest prize of $0.10 has the same behavioral
impact on men and women, so that none of the gender performance gap after winning the
smallest prize is due to a di®erential response to luck.15 Under this assumption, and with
the coe±cients on the winning and losing terms set to zero, the decomposition analysis predicts
that men outperform women by about 0.9 sliders. Thus the di®erential responses to luck explain
the rest of the performance gap observed in rounds 3 to 10, and so approximately 50% of the
performance gap is due to the winning and losing e®ects.
5 Discussion
Our experiment is designed to test for di®erences in how men and women respond to winning
or losing in a competitive environment. Further research is needed to establish exactly what
drives the di®erences we have discovered. However, we can formulate some hypotheses about
the processes which might underlie our subjects' behavior. One hypothesis is that winning and
losing induce emotional or other psycho-physiological responses which a®ect behavior in the
next round, and that the strength and nature of these responses vary by gender. In this light,
a plausible interpretation of the e®ects presented in Figure 4 is that women ¯nd losing painful
or unpleasant, whatever the level of the prize, while men only dislike losing when the prize is
substantial, and that women also dislike winning large prizes. As a result, women may have a
stronger aversion to competition than men do.
Below, we start by referring to some existing evidence regarding the emotional or other
psycho-physiological processes which might underlie the di®erent responses to winning and losing
by gender. We then link our discussion to the existing economics literature on gender di®erences
in competition, which has found that women underperform in competitive environments and
choose to enter tournaments at a lower rate than men.
15We need to make such a normalizing assumption because, as noted in footnote 9, the dummy variables for
winning and losing are co-linear, which means that, independent of the prize, we can only distinguish the di®erence
in behavior between having won and lost a previous round.
155.1 Emotional and other psycho-physiological responses
Some of the behavioral responses outlined above may be mediated by, or correlated with, mood,
con¯dence, stress, blood pressure and testosterone. The psychology and physiology literatures
have studied di®erences across gender in psycho-physiological responses to winning and losing
in competitive environments. For example, there is some evidence of gender di®erences in how
blood pressure and mood respond to winning and losing. Using a categorization-based task with
a $5 prize for the winner, Holt-Lunstad et al. (2001) ¯nd a di®erential response in diastolic blood
pressure: male winners' blood pressure is lower for than for losers, while the result is reversed
for females. The authors interpret this as evidence that women fear success, while there is a
norm of success for men. Mazur et al. (1997) ¯nd evidence that, in the absence of any monetary
incentive, women's mood responds negatively to losing a computer game, while the mood of
men does not. Following a win, however, women's and men's moods are essentially the same.
These di®erent responses in mood may also be linked to self-con¯dence: Roberts (1991) surveys
the evidence which shows that women's con¯dence about their own ability is more sensitive to
failure than men's, while men tend to attribute failure more to bad luck.
There is also evidence that women su®er greater stress in competitive environments. Mazur
et al. (1997) argue that elevated cortisol levels in their female subjects suggests that they found
the competitive environment more stressful than men (despite the lack of monetary incentives).
This chimes with Holt-Lunstad et al. (2001), who ¯nd that self-reported levels of stress are
higher for women throughout their competition. Filaire et al. (2009) ¯nd that women exhibit
higher anxiety and higher cortisol levels than men during the ¯rst round of a tennis tournament
(even though pre-match day cortisol levels did not vary by gender). Erickson et al. (2003) and
Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) review the substantial literature linking psychological anxiety and
stress to elevated levels of cortisol.
Testosterone is linked to dominant and aggressive behavior and is found in much higher levels
in men (Mazur and Booth, 1998). The physiology literature has found that the testosterone level
of male winners tends to be higher than that of male losers (e.g., Elias, 1981, for wrestlers, Booth
et al., 1989, for tennis players, and Gladue et al., 1989, in the context of a reaction time task).
Archer (2006) con¯rms the signi¯cance of the ¯nding from a statistical meta-analysis of the data,
while the survey by Mazur and Booth (1998) reports that the rise in testosterone after a win is
associated with a subject's elated mood. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the response
is mediated by the importance of the competition: Mazur et al. (1992) ¯nd that for male chess
players the di®erential response is stronger when more is at stake and when the players are closely
matched, thus providing evidence \that contestants must take their competition seriously if it is
16to a®ect their T levels" (p. 75). For women, on the other hand, most of the evidence shows no
di®erence in testosterone levels. According to Kivlighan et al. (2005), di®erential testosterone
responses to winning and losing have never been observed in women, although a contrary result
was found recently by Oliveira et al. (2009) in the context of female soccer players.
Finally, women's negative response to winning large prizes may be related to feelings of guilt
or a concern for egalitarianism. Two possible mechanisms suggest themselves. The psychological
discomfort associated with guilt may impact directly on performance. Alternatively, if women
feel that winning a large prize was undeserved they may wish to reduce e®ort in the next
period to reduce their probability of winning and so redistribute wealth in expectation to other
members of the subject pool (see Grund and Sliwka, 2005, and Gill and Stone, 2010, for analyses
of how, respectively, inequity and desert concerns a®ect competitive behavior). A number of
studies provide evidence from dictator games that women are more inequity averse or egalitarian
than men (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 1998, and Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; see Croson and
Gneezy, 2009, for a survey of the evidence). Interestingly, Bartling et al. (2009) ¯nd that the vast
majority of their all-female sample are `aheadness-averse', that is they are averse to favorable
inequity; furthermore, the study ¯nds a signi¯cant negative e®ect of aheadness-aversion on the
choice to enter a tournament for women, but no similar e®ect of aversion to unfavorable inequity
(`behindness-aversion').
5.2 Female competition aversion
As outlined in the Introduction, a recent but growing literature indicates that women are less
competitive than men: women perform less well relative to men when they compete compared
to when performance is measured in absolute terms (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2003, Gneezy and
Rustichini, 2004, Ors et al., 2008); furthermore, women choose to compete less frequently than
men (e.g., Gupta et al., 2005, Vandegrift and Yavas, 2009, Fletschner et al., 2010). Niederle and
Vesterlund (2007) ¯nd that women shy away from competition even when they are as able as
men, and provide evidence that men have a stronger preference for performing in a competitive
environment even after allowing for di®erential levels of con¯dence, risk aversion and aversion to
feedback about relative performance. As yet, beyond informal appeals to evolutionary theory,
no convincing mechanism or explanation for this residual distaste for competition exists. Booth
and Nolen (2009)'s and Gneezy et al. (2009)'s results suggest that culture and upbringing may
have some in°uence, while those of Buser (2009) and Wozniak et al. (2010) indicate that female
sex hormones play a mediating role. As Gneezy et al. (2009) put it: \An important puzzle
in this literature relates to the underlying factors responsible for the observed di®erences in
competitive inclinations" (p. 1637).
17One contribution of our research is to suggest a new mechanism which may account, at least
in part, for this aversion to competition on the part of females. If women's negative response to
losing at all prizes and winning at high prizes is mediated by psychological pain or discomfort,
and women anticipate these psychological e®ects when deciding whether or not to compete,
women should indeed choose to enter tournaments less frequently than men, who respond only
to losing at high prizes. Of course, this line of argument assumes that the relationship between
psychological e®ects and behavioral impacts is of the same magnitude for men and women. Fur-
thermore, as explained in Section 4.2.3, di®erential responses to winning and losing can account
for about half of the gender performance gap in our experiment. Thus, any underperformance of
women when they do choose to compete may also derive in part from the di®erential responses
to luck across gender.16
Risk aversion, in the standard sense of concave utility over money, cannot explain the negative
responses to losing that we observe, as marginal utility is higher after losing than after winning
so the incentive to exert e®ort should be stronger.17 Thus, researchers should be wary of
interpreting a refusal to compete as a refusal to accept the implicit monetary gamble involved in
the competition. In particular, our results suggest that women are much more likely than men to
refuse to compete when the stakes are low. If this were interpreted as evidence for risk aversion,
the estimated curvature of money utility would be very large indeed for women. Niederle and
Vesterlund (2007, p. 1084) note that the degree of risk aversion needed to explain the low rate
of entry into their tournament of the high-ability women in their sample is implausibly high. Of
course, risk aversion may nonetheless play some role in women's decision to enter tournaments
at a lower rate than men. Gupta et al. (2005), Booth and Nolen (2009) and Fletschner et al.
(2010) ¯nd that di®erential risk aversion across gender (as measured by responses to hypothetical
scenarios) explains a portion of the gender gap in selection into tournaments, while Bartling et al.
(2009) and Buser (2009) ¯nd that more risk averse females choose to compete signi¯cantly less
frequently than those that are less risk averse.
6 Conclusion
A growing body of literature documents the inferior performance of women in competitive
environments and the tendency for women to choose to enter competitions less frequently than
men (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2003, Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). In this paper we have provided
evidence which sheds new light on why women may be less competitive than men. Speci¯cally,
16Our results explain female underperformance in one-shot experiments only if women are responding to previous
wins and losses that occurred outside the laboratory.
17It is possible that strongly concave utility can explain some of the women's reduction in e®ort after winning
high prizes, though it is not clear why the e®ect should be temporary.
18we have documented large and signi¯cant gender di®erences in behavioral responses to the
outcomes of previous competitive interactions. Women's performance declines following a loss
at any prize value, while men respond negatively only when they lose a large prize. Furthermore,
women respond negatively to winning large prizes but no such e®ect exists for men. Overall,
these behavioral responses to the outcomes of previous competition explain 11% of the observed
variation in women's e®ort but only 4% of the observed variation in the e®ort of men. Thus,
in addition to ¯nding di®erent behavioral e®ects of winning and losing for men and women, we
conclude that previous competitive outcomes constitute a larger determinant of e®ort choices
for women than for men.
The gender pay gap is a well documented phenomenon (e.g., Altonji and Blank, 1999,
Bertrand and Hallock, 2001), existing in numerous countries and a®ecting women across the
spectrum of educational quali¯cations. Previous authors have noted that the occupational seg-
regation and °atter career paths of women may be linked to female aversion to competition (in
particular, see Kleinjans, 2009). Our results provide a possible explanation for female aversion
to competition and for gender di®erences in labor market outcomes. Speci¯cally, professional
success and progression requires repeated competitive interactions in the form of multiple rounds
of job applications and frequent assessments for internal promotions. To the extent that women
¯nd the experience of losing more painful on average than men do, they may be less inclined to
pursue such opportunities.
Our ¯ndings leave open a number of interesting avenues for further research. First, it would
be interesting to pin down the mechanisms which underlie the di®erent behavioral responses
that we have identi¯ed. Are they driven by psycho-physiological processes such as changes in
mood, hormones or testosterone? The discussion in Section 5.1 and the ¯ndings of Buser (2009)
and Wozniak et al. (2010), which link competition aversion to sex hormones, suggest that such
psycho-physiological processes may indeed play an important role. Can the di®erent responses
by gender be molded by culture and upbringing? The recent papers by Booth and Nolen (2009)
and Gneezy et al. (2009), which link female competition aversion to nurture, suggest that culture
and upbringing could also play a signi¯cant role in how men and women react to failure and
success. Finally, it would be important to extend our results to ¯eld evidence from labor markets,
educational environments and public elections where competition plays a large role and gender
di®erences in outcomes are apparent.
19Appendix
A Robustness
We examine the robustness of our results by: (i) re-estimating the model using di®erent, more
restrictive, instrument sets; (ii) estimating the parameters of a model speci¯cation that addi-
tionally includes variables describing competitive outcomes three rounds previously; and (iii)
examining whether the data show any direct e®ects on current behavior of the previous values
of the exogenous random draws which, as explained in Section 2, determine the winner of the
prize for each pair in every round.
Results R1, R2 and R3 in Table 4 show that the parameter estimates of the preferred
speci¯cation in Table 2 are substantively una®ected by various restrictions on the instrument
set, which are detailed in the notes to Table 4. The fourth set of results in Table 4, labeled R4,
shows that there are no e®ects on work e®ort in a given round of competitive outcomes three
rounds previously, and that the parameter estimates in Table 2 are not materially a®ected by
the inclusion of the variables detailing these extra competitive outcomes.
Our ¯nal robustness check analyzes the direct e®ects on Second Movers' e®orts in a given
round of the random draws which determined whether they won or lost in previous rounds.
By construction these random draws are exogenous and positively correlated with winning for
Second Movers; thus, by looking directly at the relationship between the previous random draws
and current work e®ort, we sidestep the endogeneity problem arising from the persistence of
unobservables which required us to use instrumental variables.
S1 in Table 5 shows the results of a linear random e®ects panel data regression of Second
Mover e®ort in a given round on the values of the random draw for that Second Mover in the
three previous rounds. The random draw in the previous round has a positive e®ect (signi¯cant
at the 5% level) on the work e®ort of women. For men the e®ect is also positive but of smaller
magnitude, and is only signi¯cant at the 10% level. Speci¯cation S2 additionally includes the
random draws interacted with the corresponding prize value. The e®ects for both men and
women become stronger and more signi¯cant. For women, we also see a signi¯cant negative
e®ect of the interaction term and persistence of the e®ects for two rounds. This reduced-
form evidence con¯rms that our subjects respond to previous competitive outcomes, that the
impacts are more persistent for women, and that neither men nor women respond to competitive


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Estimate SE Estimate SE
Random draw in round r ¡ 1; Men 0.864¤ 0.510 1.443¤¤ 0.686
Random draw in round r ¡ 2; Men -0.073 0.976 1.197 2.325
Random draw in round r ¡ 3; Men -2.312 1.539 -2.122 2.013
Random draw in round r ¡ 1; Women 1.443¤¤ 0.669 3.396¤¤¤ 0.973
Random draw in round r ¡ 2; Women -0.141 0.950 1.793¤¤ 0.781
Random draw in round r ¡ 3; Women 0.145 0.822 0.276 1.307
Random draw in round r ¡ 1 £ Prize in round r ¡ 1; Men - - -0.297 0.294
Random draw in round r ¡ 2 £ Prize in round r ¡ 2; Men - - -0.627 0.732
Random draw in round r ¡ 3 £ Prize in round r ¡ 3; Men - - -0.179 0.339
Random draw in round r ¡ 1 £ Prize in round r ¡ 1; Women - - -1.041¤¤¤ 0.381
Random draw in round r ¡ 2 £ Prize in round r ¡ 2; Women - - -1.090¤¤ 0.424
Random draw in round r ¡ 3 £ Prize in round r ¡ 3; Women - - 0.006 0.420
Intercept; Men 27.250¤¤¤ 1.593 27.406¤¤¤ 1.324





¤¤¤ denote, respectively, signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow clustering at the subject level.
Table 5: Direct e®ect of previous random draws on current e®ort.
B Experimental instructions
Please open the brown envelope you have just collected. I am reading from the four page
instructions sheet which you will ¯nd in your brown envelope. [Open brown envelope]
Thank you for participating in this session. There will be a number of pauses for you to ask
questions. During such a pause, please raise your hand if you want to ask a question. Apart
from asking questions in this way, you must not communicate with anybody in this room. Please
now turn o® mobile phones and any other electronic devices. These must remain turned o® for
the duration of this session. Are there any questions?
You have been allocated to a computer booth according to the number on the card you
selected as you came in. You must not look into any of the other computer booths at any time
during this session. As you came in you also selected a white sealed envelope. Please now open
your white envelope. [Open white envelope]
22Each white envelope contains a di®erent four digit Participant ID number. To ensure
anonymity, your actions in this session are linked to this Participant ID number and at the
end of this session you will be paid by Participant ID number. You will be paid a show up fee
of $4 together with any money you accumulate during this session. The amount of money you
accumulate will depend partly on your actions, partly on the actions of others and partly on
chance. All payments will be made in cash in another room. Neither I nor any of the other
participants will see how much you have been paid. Please follow the instructions that will
appear shortly on your computer screen to enter your four digit Participant ID number. [Enter
four digit Participant ID number] Please now return your Participant ID number to its
envelope, and keep this safe as your Participant ID number will be required for payment at the
end.
This session consists of 2 practice rounds, for which you will not be paid, followed by 10
paying rounds with money prizes. In each round you will undertake an identical task lasting
120 seconds. The task will consist of a screen with 48 sliders. Each slider is initially positioned
at 0 and can be moved as far as 100. Each slider has a number to its right showing its current
position. You can use the mouse in any way you like to move each slider. You can readjust
the position of each slider as many times as you wish. Your \points score" in the task will be
the number of sliders positioned at exactly 50 at the end of the 120 seconds. Are there any
questions?
Before the ¯rst practice round, you will discover whether you are a \First Mover" or a
\Second Mover". You will remain either a First Mover or a Second Mover for the entirety of
this session.
In each round, you will be paired. One pair member will be a First Mover and the other
will be a Second Mover. The First Mover will undertake the task ¯rst, and then the Second
Mover will undertake the task. The Second Mover will see the First Mover's points score before
starting the task.
In each paying round, there will be a prize which one pair member will win. Each pair's
prize will be chosen randomly at the beginning of the round and will be between $0.10 and
$3.90. The winner of the prize will depend on the di®erence between the First Mover's and the
Second Mover's points scores and some element of chance. If the points scores are the same,
each pair member will have a 50% chance of winning the prize. If the points scores are not the
same, the chance of winning for the pair member with the higher points score increases by 1
percentage point for every increase of 1 in the di®erence between the points scores, while the
chance of winning for the pair member with the lower points score correspondingly decreases
by 1 percentage point. The table at the end of these instructions gives the chance of winning
23for any points score di®erence. Please look at this table now. [Look at table] Are there any
questions?
During each task, a number of pieces of information will appear at the top of your screen,
including the time remaining, the round number, whether you are a First Mover or a Second
Mover, the prize for the round and your points score in the task so far. If you are a Second
Mover, you will also see the points score of the First Mover you are paired with.
After both pair members have completed the task, each pair member will see a summary
screen showing their own points score, the other pair member's points score, their probability
of winning, the prize for the round and whether they were the winner or the loser of the round.
We will now start the ¯rst of the two practice rounds. In the practice rounds, you will be
paired with an automaton who behaves randomly. Before we start, are there any questions?
Please look at your screen now. [First practice round] Before we start the second practice
round, are there any questions? Please look at your screen now. [Second practice round]
Are there any questions?
The practice rounds are ¯nished. We will now move on to the 10 paying rounds. In every
paying round, each First Mover will be paired with a Second Mover. The pairings will be changed
after every round and pairings will not depend on your previous actions. You will not be paired
with the same person twice. Furthermore, the pairings are done in such a way that the actions
you take in one round cannot a®ect the actions of the people you will be paired with in later
rounds. This also means that the actions of the person you are paired with in a given round
cannot be a®ected by your actions in earlier rounds. (If you are interested, this is because you
will not be paired with a person who was paired with someone who had been paired with you,
and you will not be paired with a person who was paired with someone who had been paired
with someone who had been paired with you, and so on.) Are there any questions?
We will now start the 10 paying rounds. There will be no pauses between the rounds.
Before we start the paying rounds, are there any remaining questions? There will be no further
opportunities to ask questions. Please look at your screen now. [10 paying rounds]
The session is now complete. Your total cash payment, including the show up fee, is displayed
on your screen. Please leave the room one by one when asked to do so to receive your payment.
Remember to bring the envelope containing your four digit Participant ID number with you but
please leave all other materials on your desk. Thank you for participating.
24Di®erence in Chance of winning prize Chance of winning prize


















































49 Not possible as there are only 48 sliders
50 Not possible as there are only 48 sliders
Table 6: Chance of winning in a given round.
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